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COMMENT
DON'T I KNOW YOU FROM SOMEWHERE?:
WHY DUE PROCESS SHOULD BARJUDGES
FROM PRESIDING OVER CASES WHEN




Picture the following scenario: California voters elect a Su-
perior Court Judge who was formerly a Los Angeles County
Deputy District Attorney who prosecuted OJ. Simpson in his
criminal case. Some months later, Simpson is arrested and
charged with grand larceny in an unrelated matter, and his case
is randomly assigned to that judge's chambers. Hopefully, the
judge would recognize the possibility that she was likely biased
against Simpson, or at least would appear so to many people,
and would recuse herself. However, for whatever reason, she
presides in Simpson's case. The defendant is convicted, and af-
ter exhausting all of his state remedies, files a habeas corpus pe-
tition in federal court alleging a due process violation.
Simpson's lawyers posit that although the trial record shows no
overt bias, Simpson was unable to get a fair trial because the
judge may have felt that her failure to convict Simpson in his
murder trial allowed Simpson to commit this second crime.
Could the judge divorce herself from her past involvement
with Mr. Simpson and her intimate knowledge of the crime pre-
viously alleged? Could she conduct a trial comporting with the
due process promise of a neutral adjudicator? Does it matter
whether or not the appearance of injustice might compromise
her participation in the grand larceny trial?
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The question of whether a defendant has a due process
right not to be tried by a judge who has previously prosecuted
him on an unrelated offense has not been directly addressed by
the Supreme Court. However, the scenario strikes at the heart
of our notions of fairness and judicial impartiality.! Whatever
else due process guarantees, especially in the criminal context,
its most vital element is a neutral, independent adjudicator.
Since the advent of legal realism and modem psychology, it
is almost universally recognized that no one's mind is a tabula
rasa, and that judges do not live in ivory towers.3 Even when a
party has no direct connection to ajudge, subtle and unspoken
factors may impact the decision-maker's rulings. As Professor
Leubsdorf points out:
To decide when ajudge may not sit is to define what ajudge is ....
One can scarcely advance the ideal of judicial impartiality without feel-
ing doubts. We all take it for granted that personal values and assump-
'Judicial neutrality falls under the rubric of due process guaranteed by the Consti-
tution. "No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. "[N] or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of the law." Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
Under federal statute, parties may move for removal of a judge for bias under 28
U.S.C. § 144 (1994), which provides:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely
and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a
personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party,
such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned
to hear such proceeding. The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for
the belief.... It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stat-
ing that it is made in good faith.
Section 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994) is also salient:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself
in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or per-
son knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceed-
ing... ;
(2) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity
participated as counsel, advisor or material witness concerning the pro-
ceeding... ;
2See Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the
Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE LJ. 455, 457 (1986). Professors Redish and
Marshall argue that, at least in some adjudicatory proceedings, a neutral arbiter is
both a necessary and sufficient factor in assessing whether a party has received proce-
dural due process. Id.
" SeeJeffrey M. Shaman, The Impartial Judge: Detachment or Passion?, 45 DEPAUL L.
REV. 605 (1996).
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tions help shape every judge's decisions. Suggesting that ajudge- could
escape her prepossessions sounds like a throwback to the days when
people believed .... that judges deciding constitutional issues placed a
challenged law next to the Constitution and checked whether the one
would fit inside the other.4
When ajudge has some positive or negative connection to a
party, or the judge is tempted to make rulings based on extraju-
dicial factors, a potentially impermissible bias is added to these
accepted "values, assumptions and prepossessions,"5 and may
poison the due process well. As the New Hampshire Supreme
Court has stated, "[ilt is the right of every citizen to be tried by
judges as impartial as the lot of humanity will admit."6 Even if
the actual outcome is not tainted by bias, the appearance ofjus-
tice is compromised by the potential for bias.
This Comment examines whether a criminal defendant can
obtain a truly neutral adjudication or a trial satisfying the "ap-
pearance of justice" when the presiding judge has. previously
prosecuted him in an unrelated matter. I do not suggest that
judges who previously served as prosecutors are undesirable.7
On the contrary, those involved in judicial selection often see
prosecutorial experience as a valued asset.8 It is only in specific,
easily identifiable circumstances where there is a direct conflict
between the judge and the defendant that prosecutors-turned-
judges should disqualify themselves or be disqualified. Man-
dated disqualifications should be limited, as many conscientious
judges will disqualify themselves if they recognize the problems
that such trials represent both for individual defendants and the
whole system.
4 John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disquaification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv.
237-38 (1987) (footnote omitted). See also Peter David Blanck, The Appearance ofJus-
lice: The Appearance ofJustice Revisited, 86J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINoLOGY 887 (1996).
' Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 238.
6 In re Mussman, 302 A.2d 822, 824 (N.H. 1973) (citations omitted); see also Sha-
man, supra note 3, at 605.
7 Such an argument would not only be untenable but would fly in the face of
common practice. Of President Clinton's 187 judicial nominees in his first term,
nearly 40% were former prosecutors. SeeJack Quinn, GOP Playing Politics on Clinton
Judicial Choices, U.S.A. TODAY, Apr. 23, 1996 at 11A.
a Interview with Abner J. Mikva, former White House Counsel, in Chicago, Ill.
(Dec. 18, 1996). Judge Mikva was intimately involved in the selection of federal
judges when he served as White House Counsel. Among the attractive factors prose-
cutors bring to the federal bench are: familiarity with law and procedure; demon-




First, this Comment reviews Supreme Court decisions defin-
ing a neutral and independent adjudicator. Second, because
the Court has not addressed whether defendants have a due
process right not to be tried by a judge who has previously
prosecuted them, this Comment reviews lower court opinions to
show that their inconsistency with the Supreme Court's defini-
tion of due process fails to protect defendants in this situation.
Third, this Comment briefly examines the differing roles of
prosecutor and judge. While there are areas where skill and
experience as a prosecutor may benefit a judge, there are also
facets of the prosecutorial function that can potentially cause
serious tension between the two roles. Fourth, this Comment
focuses on two major failings ofjudicial review in this area. One
is the frequent underestimation of the influence trial judges
have over the outcome of trials. This influence may unfairly
prejudice defendants, even unintentionally, by permitting
judges who have previously prosecuted the defendant to adjudi-
cate a new case against the defendant. Also, reviewing courts
have failed to reconcile the non-instrumental values due process
serves, such as participation, justification and openness, when
allowing a defendant to be tried by a judge who has previously
prosecuted him. Fifth and finally, this Comment proposes that
courts should find that when a judge played a tangible role in
previously prosecuting the defendant before them, the defen-
dant has a due process right not to be tried by thatjudge.
II. WHAT COURTS HAVE HELD CONsTrruTEs
A NEUTRAL ADJUDICATOR
Before examining the specific question posed by this Com-
ment, it is necessary to understand the types of judicial conflict
of interest or bias the Supreme Court and lower federal courts
recognize as violating an individual's due process.
The Supreme Court's first pronouncement on this issue
remains its most oft-quoted: a due process violation occurs when
some temptation would lead a judge "not to hold the balance
nice, clear and true between the State and the accused.... ."9 In
Tumey v. Ohio, the Court invalidated a scheme under which an
unlawful possession of liquor charges was adjudicated by a town
9 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
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mayor empowered to assess fines for culpability.'0 Per a state
statute, the proceeds of the fine were split evenly between the
municipality and Ohio's state treasury.1 The municipality al-
lowed the mayor to recover his out-of-pocket costs if the pro-
ceeding resulted in a conviction. 2
Despite the absence of any evidence showing actual bias by
the mayor in adjudicating Tumey's case, a unanimous Supreme
Court held that the scheme violated Tumey's Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights.' The Court was apparently un-
troubled by the lack of specific evidence showing the mayor's
partiality-it recognized the inherent difficulties such a showing
would place on both the Tumey and the mayor.14
In deciding Tumey, the Supreme Court stated what has be-
come a central, although somewhat opaque, tenet of due proc-
ess neutrality:
Every procedure which Would offer a possible temptation to the average
man as ajudge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the de-
fendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and
true between the state and the accused, denies the latter due process of
the law."5
In defining the outer limits of what "possible temptation" might
induce a judge "not to hold the balance nice, clear and true,"
the Tumey Court set no threshold of incentive automatically
triggering a due process violation. In the absence of a bright
line, and acknowledging the difficulties of computing such a
calculus, "it seems reasonable to conclude that any financial
temptation, regardless of how indirect or insubstantial, presents
a possibility of temptation."6
While Tumey's holding did not absolutely limit the constitu-
tional due process protection of an unbiased adjudicator to
cases in which bias, or the appearance of bias, stemmed from fi-
nancial temptation, the Court came close in dicta. In finding a
constitutional violation in the case before it, the Court stated
that "not all questions ofjudicial qualification... involve consti-
'o Id. at 510.
" Id. at 517.
1 Id. at 520.
"3 Id. at 510.
14 Id. See also Redish & Marshall, supra note 2, at 495.
'- Tumey, 273 U.S at 532.
16 Redish & Marshall, supra note 2, at 496. This was born out in Connally v. Georgia,
429 U.S. 245 (1977) (per curium). See infra text accompanying notes 28-29.
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tutional validity. Thus matters merely of kinship, personal bias,
state policy, and remoteness of interest, would seem generally to
be matters merely of legislative discretion." 7 However, because
the mayor's interest was "direct, personal... [and] pecuniary,"
Tumey's due process rights were violated.18
In 1955, the Supreme Court deviated from this focus on fi-
nancial conflict of interest in In re Murchison, a decision
authored by Justice Black. 19 Relying on Tumey, the Court held
that a Michigan judge sitting as a one-man grand jury could not
punish witnesses for contempt for conduct arising out of the
grand jury hearings. 20 The Court ruled that upholding such a
system permitted ajudge to serve as judge "in his own case and
no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the
outcome."2' The Court took pains to note that while the "inter-
est" triggering the judge's disqualification escaped precise defi-
nition, it did not necessarily have to be financial temptation.
Most strikingly, Justice Black wrote:
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fair-
ness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But
our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability
of unfairness .... Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial judges
who have no actual bias and who do their very best to weigh the scales of
justice equally between contending parties. But to perform its highest
function in the best way, 'justice must satisfy the appearance ofjustice."2s
In other words, to satisfy due process guarantees, even the
possibility of unfairness as manifested through a potentially bi-
ased adjudicator must be prevented. Equally important for de-
fendants faced with trial by a judge who previously prosecuted
them, the basis for bias, or the appearance of bias, was not lim-
ited to financial motivation.24
However, in the 1970s two important cases reaffirmed and
underscored the Supreme Court's focus on a judge's potential
financial bias as a due process disqualifier.2 In Ward v. Village of
'7 Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523; see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
'" Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523.
9 In reMurchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
'0 Id. at 134.




See Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977) (per curiam); Ward v. Village of
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
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Monroeville, the financial temptation again revolved around a
mayor empowered to sit as judge with the fines he assessed con-
tributing a substantial portion of the town's fisc, and thus his
wages.2 As in Tumey, the Court rejected the town's scheme de-
spite the absence of any actual bias on the mayor's part.2
Similarly, Connally v. Georgia featured a system that offered
state Justices of the Peace $5.00 for issuing search warrants. The
Georgia system provided no compensation for denial of the
warrant.28 In overruling the Georgia Supreme Court, the
United States Supreme Court specifically rejected the idea that
a $5.00 fee amounted to a de minimis violation, thus invalidating
Georgia's "fee for warrants" system.2
Perhaps because neither case presented the occasion to
consider the issue, the Court did not reiterate its prior limita-
tion of due process protection to cases involving financial temp-
tation. Nothing in either decision suggested a narrowing of In
re Murchison's broad language. However, in Aetna Life Insurance
Co. v. Lavoie,"° a divided Court reinforced the financial tempta-
tion limit on due process protection.1  The facts of Aetna
showed two kinds of bias against the defendant.2 First, the Ala-
26 Ward, 409 U.S. at 57. The town netted almost half of its revenues from the fines.
Id. at58.
27 Id. The Court held that a "possible temptation" existed because the mayor's ju-
dicial responsibility and his partisan interests in maximizing village revenue were
"practically and seriously inconsistent," thus making it impossible for the defendant
to get a fair trial. Id. at 60.
' Connally, 429 U.S. at 246.
9Id. at 251. While the ConnaUy decision makes sense, it highlights the fallacy of a
bright line distinction between financial bias and bias brought about by personal
animus or prior involvement with a defendant. From a normative standpoint, it is dif-
ficult to swallow the principle that a defendant's right to a fair trial is compromised
more by a $5.00 pay-off than by a hypothetical former prosecutor's outrage or vindic-
tiveness at seeing a defendant in front of her whom she once vigorously argued
should be sent to jail for life.
475 U.S. 813 (1986).
Id. at 820. In Aetna, the plaintiff, Margaret Lavoie, brought suit against the de-
fendant insurance company for failure to pay a claim. Id.
12 One of Alabama's Supreme CourtJustices, Justice Embry, had two on-going civil
actions against insurance companies contemporaneously with the appeal in Margaret
Lavoie's case. Id. at 817. In one, Justice Embry alleged bad-faith refusal to pay a
claim arising from his wife's loss of a valuable mink coat. In the other, Justice Embry
was the class representative for a suit on behalf of Alabama's state employees alleging
willful and intentional withholding of payment. Both suits sought punitive damages.
Id.
During one of Justice Embry's depositions, he stated that he had had problems
with insurance companies for "years and years." Aetna contended that this showed
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bama Supreme Court justices were alleged to be predisposed
against the defendants (insurance companies) by reason of per-
sonal animus.3 ' Second, and more significantly, there was a po-
tential financial interest on the part of Justice Embry, who cast
the deciding vote in what was a precedent-establishing case.'
In dismissing Aetna's claim that Justice Embry's previously
expressed personal antipathy toward insurance companies war-
ranted a new trial, ChiefJustice Burger pointed to both the lan-
guage in Tumey, which suggested that only financial bias could
constitute a due process violation, and supporting common law
history."5 Chief Justice Burger limited this portion of his deci-
sion to Aetna's specific facts.6 The Court did not completely
shut the door on non-monetary bias as a constitutional issue
however, noting that courts should only find due process viola-
tions "in the most extreme cases.., and [Aetna's] arguments
here fall well below that level."3 7 Justice Embry's financial inter-
est violated Aetna's due process because it "had the clear and
immediate effect of enhancing both the legal status and settle-
ment value of his own case."3
Justice Brennan expressed strong disagreement with the
majority's emphasis on financial conflicts of interest in a con-
curring opinion:
I do not understand that.., the Court states that only an interest that
satisfies this test [the interest be direct, substantial and pecuniary] will
that Embry was constitutionally and impermissibly biased against it. Id. at 820. The
U.S. Supreme Court rejected this argument. Id at 821.
Embry's potential recovery in the second suit was contingent on the precedent es-
tablished in the Alabama Supreme Court's decision in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. La-
voie, 470 So. 2d 1060 (Ala. 1985)-the case that went before the United States
Supreme Court.
Aetna, 475 U.S. at 820.
Id. Whether the fact that Embry cast the deciding vote was the source of the due
process violation split the Supreme Court. The majority suggested that if Embry's
vote was not outcome determinative, his potential bias might have been harmless.
The concurrence suggested otherwise. Compare Aetna, 475 U.S. at 831, with id. at 831-
33 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
The issue of whether or not a due process violation is contingent on the biased
judge's participation being outcome determinative has subsequently caused a circuit
split. Compare Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 1995) (participation of one bi-
ased decisionmaker on a multi-member panel invalidates entire decision), with Brad-
shaw v. McCotter, 796 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1986).






taint the judge's participation as a due process violation. Nonpecuniary
interests, for example, have been found to require recusal as a matter of
due process... The participation of ajudge who has a substantial inter-
est in the outcome of a case... necessarily imports a bias into the delib-
erative process. This deprives litigants of the assurance of impartiality
that is the fundamental requirement of due process.9
The Supreme Court's most recent case involving judicial
bias is Bracy v. Gram ly.40 In Bracy, the Court held that where a
habeas corpus petitioner could rebut the presumption of a
judge's probity, he was entitled to discovery on the question of
whether or not the judge was actually biased against him.4
Bracy was tried and sentenced to death in front of a judge who
frequently solicited bribes from other criminal defendants. 2
Bracy's argument was that in cases without bribery, the judge
was "hard" on defendants in order not to draw attention to his
otherwise pro-defendant rulings.43 Although the Court noted
that Bracy's contention was "s~eculative," because there was so
much evidence of corruption, it granted him discovery to at-
tempt to prove his argument.45 Despite the difficulties of proof,
the Court held that, "if it could be proved, such compensatory,
camouflaging bias on [the judge's] part in petitioner's own case
would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."4
The Court made no mention of directly overturning Bracy's
conviction and death sentence based on the appearance of un-
fairness, nor did it delve into whether on its face the judge's
corruption and possible bias was sufficient to fail the Tumey or
Murchison tests. Thus, while Bracy holds out the possibility that
defendants can obtain discovery, it sheds little light on the ques-
tion of whether, in the absence of concrete evidence showing
bias, a trial in front of an "interested" judge can ever be consti-
tutionally infirmed.
"Id. at 829 (Brennan,J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
117 S. Ct. 1793 (1997).41 Id. at 1797.
42 id. at 1795-96.
Id. at 1797.
" The Court noted that the trial judge, who was caught up in the web of the Chi-
cago anti-corruption "Operation Greylord" effort, was "thoroughly steeped in corrup-
tion." Id. at 1799.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 1797. Following the Sup-eme Court's Bracy decision, the Illinois Supreme
Court ruled that a defendant had in fact been denied due process where the trial
judge presided over a case where he first accepted a bribe and then returned it to the
defendant. People v. Hawkins, 609 N.E.2d 999 (Ill. 1998).
1998]
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Despite Bracy, the distinction between financial and other
kinds of bias (such as kinship or extreme personal antipathy)
that the Tumey and Aetna Courts drew seems misplaced at best.
It serves no constitutional purpose to allow a judge to sit in a
case in which her niece is the defendant, or in which her best
friend was the victim of a crime, but not to sit in a case where a
$5 benefit might accrue to her.
One commentator has suggested that the only justification
for this standard is the Court's desire to obtain the advantages
of a "bright-line distinction."47 The problem with this distinc-
tion is that the bright line seems to have been drawn in the
dark-it excludes cases of potential bias, which may be far more
egregious than those motivated by small financial gain. The re-
sult of this rule is that it may be constitutional for "grossly biased
decisionmakers [to be] allowed to try cases."48
Notwithstanding the Court's focus on financial bias in Tu-
mey and Aetna, it is clear from In re Murchison, and Justice Bren-
nan's concurrence in Aetna, that financial bias need not be the
only reason for judges to be disqualified from presiding over tri-
47 See Paul B. Lewis, Systemic Due Process: Procedural Concepts and the Problem of Recusa4
38 U. KAN. L REV. 381, 385 (1990). Lewis notes that "[jludicial prejudice based not
only on financial interest, but also on bias or relationship is antithetical to the rule of
law." Id.
Another justification for the focus on financial conflicts of interest besides the
"bright line distinction," is the fact that at common law, this was the only type of bias
that forced judicial recusal. See, e.g., Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B. 1608); 3
WiLIAM BLACxSrONE, COMMENTARIES *361. See also John P. Frank, Disqualification of
Judges, 56 Y E L.J. 605, 609 (1947) (explaining that judges were only disqualified for
direct pecuniary interest).
For a full treatment of the subject of financial conflict of interest and judicial bias,
see Steven Lubet, Disqualjfication of Supreme Court Justices: The Certiorari Conundrum, 80
MINN. L. REv. 657 (1996); Steven Lubet, Regulation ofJudges'Business and Financial Ac-
tivities, 37 EMoRYL.J. 1 (1988).
8 Lewis, supra note 47, at 386. Differences of opinion over whether due process
protections ofjudicial neutrality extend beyond financial conflicts are seen through
the prism of whether one believes due process is flexible, or whether it is inflexible
and ought be cast in stone as mandated by the dictates of common law and statutes.
Compare Redish & Marshall, supra note 2, at 457-68, with Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dep't
of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1389 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J., con-
curring), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1404 (1995). Redish and Marshall certainly have the
late Justice Frankfurter on their side. Frankfurter wrote that due process is not con-
fined to "particular forms in which rights have heretofore been found to have been
curtailed for want of procedural fairness. Due Process is perhaps the most majestic
concept in our whole Constitutional system... it is... a living principle not confined
to past instances." Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 174
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
als. Indeed, In re Murchison points to the fact that ajudge's per-
sonal embroilment with a party can, in extreme cases, result in a
due process violation. Moreover, the Supreme Court has never
expressly required a showing of actual bias in order to find a
due process violation, and has even disavowed the need for such
a showing. 9 Even the temptation of as little as $5.00 was suffi-
cient to invalidate a criminal conviction in Connally v. Georgia.50
Yet in light of the Supreme Court's lack of clear guidance in
bias cases, it is not surprising that lower courts do not find it
troublesome when judges sit in cases where they have previously
prosecuted the defendant on unrelated charges. If this situa-
tion is recognized early enough, however, the problem can be
avoided in many states through a peremptory request for a dif-
ferentjudge5 1 Where these challenges are not available, the is-
sue may arise in federal courts post-conviction, when a prisoner
files a petition for habeas corpus.52 When a bias allegation is
brought in federal court, the defendant may move for recusal
under 28 U.S.C. § 455. 3 This provides for recusal where a
" See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972); In re Murchison, 349
U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
'0 429 U.S. 245, 251 (1977) (per curiam).
51 SeeALaStA STAT. § 22.20.022 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-409 (West
1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 601-7(b) (1993); 725 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/114-5(a) (West
1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-5-1 (West 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-311d (1995);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 542.16 (West 1988); NEV. Sup. Cr. R. 48:1; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-3-
9 (Michie 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-15-21 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 14-250 to 70
(1995); S.D. CODIED LAws § 15-12-22 (Michie 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
4.12.040-50 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.58 (West Supp. 1994).
See also Blanck, supra note 4; text accompanying notes 92-114.
" Since 1953, the Supreme Court has allowed prisoners to attack their state convic-
tions collaterally through habeas corpus by petitioning lower federal courts to review
their trials for procedural defects. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). The
federal habeas statute, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-66 (1994 & Supp. 1997). For a prisoner
in state custody to obtain a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner must show that the
law was applied to him in a manner contrary to, or unreasonably in light of, a clearly
established federal law as interpreted by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1)
(1994 & Supp. 1997).
Under habeas corpus jurisprudence, there are structural constitutional errors and
trial errors. A trial with a structural error, on its face, violates a defendant's due proc-
ess. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 289-90 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
Judicial bias is one of those structural errors, and cannot be harmless. Id. at 290
(White, J., dissenting). Less important are "trial" errors, which are harmless and do
not require overturning a conviction unless they have a "substantial and injurious" in-
fluence on the jury's verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 622 (1993).
5 28 U.S.C. § 455 (a)-(b) (1) (1994). See supra note 1 for the text of § 455.
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judge's impartiality may be reasonably questioned or appears
unfair because of prejudice or bias from an extrajudicial
54
source.
The allegations of bias and the degree of apparent injustice
in these cases varies widely. In some, the convicted defendant
has merely alleged that the prosecutor-turned-judge signed off
on a brief or played a tertiary role in a long ago criminal case.5
In others, the history between the defendant and the judge is
more substantial, and thus more troublesome. In all cases,
federal appeals court judges have found there was either insuffi-
cient evidence to find bias or no appearance of unfairness.
5' See James Oleske, The Authority of the Trial Judge, 84 GEO. U.J. 1179, 1181-83
(1996).
SeeMurphy v. Beto, 416 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1969).
See Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1368-69 (7th Cir.
1994) (en banc) [hereinafter Del Vecchio II], cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1404 (1995).
17 Outside of 28 U.S.C. § 455, it is unclear whether a judge should sit in a case
where he has been involved in the actual prosecution of the defendant in that par-
ticular case, although it seems that if the involvement is any more than mere formal-
ity, the judge will be disqualified. See Bradshaw v. McCotter, 785 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir.)
[hereinafter Bradshaw I], modifted by 796 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Brad-
shaw II]. In Bradshaw I, the Fifth Circuit granted a habeas petition on the grounds
that a Texas Appeals Court judge should not have heard a case where his name ap-
peared on the prosecution's brief, even though the judge's name appeared on the
brief only as a formality. The petitioner was not required to show any proof that the
judge was biased----"the appearance [of the judge's name] undermined a fundamen-
tal aspect of our criminal justice system: ajudge's neutrality. The separation between
the roles of judge and prosecutor must be certain and inflexible." Bradshaw I, 785
F.2d at 1329. In Bradshaw II, the same court ruled that, in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986), the fact that
the appellate courtjudge's vote was not outcome determinative made the error harm-
less, and thus reversed its decision to grant the writ. 796 F.2d at 101.
Concurring with the new result, one judge wrote that he disagreed with the ap-
pearance of fairness rule used in Bradshaw L Id. (Gee, J., concurring). Examining
the facts, Judge Gee noted that there was no possibility that an average person would
be tempted or biased against the defendant because his name appeared on the
prosecution's brief. Thus, the rule of "appearance of fairness" discussed in In re Mur-
chison is only applicable "where a real possibility of bias exists against the defendant
on the part of thejudge." Id. at 102 (Gee,J., concurring). The judge wrote:
The rule [for disqualification] to apply is a prophylactic one keyed to the ability
and temperament of the average man, even though the particular judge in ques-
tion might be capable of rising above the situation .... [W]here there is room
for doubt about the existence of bias I quite agree that appearance must be
served. Doing so will sometimes require one who feels no bias to disqualify him-
self despite this. But where there is no room for doubt and no contention what-
ever of actual bias, I do not believe that naked appearances should be held to
require a magistrate's recusal.
Id. at 102-03 (Gee,J., concurring).
RECUSAL
There are two states whose courts have reversed the convictions
of defendants who were tried by judges who previously prose-
cuted them on unrelated offenses. However, those cases do not
specifically rely on the federal Constitution.58
In People v. Correlli,9 a New York appeals court partially ad-
dressed the problem analyzed in this Comment. The judge in
Correlli had previously prosecuted the defendant in an unrelated
cas6&. The court reversed Correlli's conviction even though the
judge claimed he could be entirely impartial, because the "ap-
pearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public con-
fidence in the administration ofjustice as the actual presence of
bias or prejudice. 61  The court noted that regardless of how
guilty the defendant was, he was entitled to adjudication from a
tribunal free of any possible bias. Trial by a judge who had pre-
viously prosecuted him did not accord Correlli that right.
62
However, a serious shortcoming in the Correlli decision was its
failure to ground the right to be free from such an unfair trial
in any textual mandate-either constitutional, state statute or
judicial code.
The widest ranging pronouncement on whether defendants
have a constitutional right not to be tried by a judge who has
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2), ajudge must disqualify himself where he has "served
in governmental employment, and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser,
or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning
the merits of the particular case in controversy." See supra note 1. Thus, ajudge may
not preside over hearings where he, as an Assistant U.S. Attorney, had represented
the government on an underlying matter involving the criminal case now in front of
him as ajudge. Mixon v. United States, 620 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1980). Where the
judge was not "actively involved" in the underlying prosecution, courts have held that
he did not "participate" under the meaning of § 455, and no recusal is statutorily
mandated. See Mangum v. Hargett, 67 F.3d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 957 (1996); United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323, 1326 (10th Cir. 1988). For an
interpretation of a similar statute in the military court system, see United States v.
Kincheloe, 14 M.J. 40 (C.Ma. 1982).
"Carter v. Commonwealth, 641 S.W.2d 758 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982); accord Woods v.
Commonwealth 793 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1990). In Carter, the Kentucky judicial recusal
statute was interpreted to mandatorily disqualify ajudge from a case in which he pre-
viously prosecuted the defendant even if there was "no hint in the record of any im-
propriety or bias on the part of the [judge]," and the trial judge had "little, if any,
recollection of any involvement in the [defendant's] plea bargaining." Carter, 641
S.W.2d at 759-60. See also People v. Correlli, 343 N.Y.S.2d 555 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973);
accord People v. Smith, 503 N.Y.S.2d 72 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).





previously prosecuted them came in 1979 in.Jenkins v. Borden-
kircher.6 3 The Sixth Circuit in Jenkins refused to establish a per se
rule prohibiting judges from sitting in cases where they had
previously prosecuted the defendant.64 InJenkins, the trial judge
had prosecuted the defendant on four occasions in a span of
nine years, with the last prosecution coming only five years prior
to the instant trial.r6 The charges in the case at hand were
armed robbery and murder; the previous charges ranged from
felonies such as brandishing a murderous weapon to grand lar-
66
ceny.
In reaching its decision, the Sixth Circuit found significant
the fact that the charges in the murder trial "were of an entirely
different magnitude" than the charges on which the judge had
prosecuted the defendant.67 The court did not rule out the pos-
sibility that a closer connection between the previously prose-
cuted crimes and the crime at hand might have compelled a
different result.66
The Sixth Circuit refused to consider granting a habeas pe-
tition based on the defendant's argument that irrespective of ac-
tual bias, an inherent temptation existed for a judge to be
prejudiced against a defendant he previously prosecuted. 6  In-
stead, the court combed the record for evidence of actual bias
and found none.70 The court praised the trial judge for putting
all motions and rulings on the record, not holding unreported
bench conferences or proceedings in chambers and fully ex-
plaining his rationale for "each ruling of consequence."7'
In addition to Jenkins, other lower federal courts have re-
fused to find cognizable grounds for due process violations in a
number of contexts where no actual bias or substantial tempta-
6 611 F.2d 162, 166 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 943 (1980).
"Id. at 167.






7, Id. at 166. By countering the defendant's claim of an inherent appearance of
bias with a review of the actual record, the court seemingly conceded that the possi-
bility of bias existed, but nevertheless implied that the appearance of unfairness was
either irrelevant or nugatory.
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tion for bias was shown. For example, in Murphy v. Beto,7 a
court denied habeas corpus relief to a petitioner where the trial
court judge was the district attorney at the time of a prior prose-
cution, but there was no evidence he had played an active role
in the petitioner's trial.73 Similarly, in Layer v. Lyles7 4 a district
court found no due process violation where the presiding trial
judge was both a prosecuting and defending attorney for the
defendant in a previous trial.75 Unlike Jenkins, however, in Layer
the prior trials were for crimes of substantially the same magni-
tude as the instant case.76 Both Lyle and Murphy essentially re-
jected the "appearance of fairness" test in favor of an actual bias
test.'
In a more recent case, where similar but not identical due
process concerns were at stake, the Tenth Circuit laid out a two-
step test that more accurately reflects the Supreme Court's cur-
rent approach of an "appearance of fairness" test.78 The Tenth
Circuit attempted to reconcile divergent due process standards
on judicial bias. On the one hand, it noted the requirement
that a judge be "actually biased or prejudiced against the peti-
tioner,"7 and on the other it noted the Supreme Court's "ap-
pearance of bias" standard in In re Murchison.80 Thus, the lower
court allowed the petitioner to establish a due process violation
in one of two ways."' He could show that the judge was actually
showing bias, or he could demonstrate that the appearance of
bias created a "conclusive presumption of actual bias." 2 Be-
cause there was no contention of actual bias, the court exam-
2 416 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 100.
7 '598 F. Supp. 95, 98 (D. Md. 1984), affd, 767 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1985).
7-Id. at 102.
76 Id. at 96-97.
Id. at 102; Murphy, 416 F.2d at 100.
Fero v. Kirby, 39 F.3d 1462, 1478 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2278
(1995). Here, the defendant's argument was not premised on the judge's position as
a former prosecutor, but rather on the fact that the judge's son was a clerk for the
prosecution. Id. at 1475. The judge's brother-in-law had also filed a wrongful death
action against the defendant on behalf of the victim's family. Id. These facts, while
not exactly the same as those this Comment is concerned with, are similar enough to
make a strong analogy.
" Id. at 1478 (citations omitted).
80 349 U.S. 133 (1955). See supra text accompanying notes 19-24 for a discussion of
In re Murchison.
8, Few, 39 F.3d at 1478.
82 Id.
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ined the standards under which the claim of a conclusive pre-
sumption of bias could be maintained.3
The key factor was whether an incentive for actual bias ex-
isted. The court strictly interpreted the Supreme Court's Tumey
analysis, which suggested that the incentive for bias is almost ex-
clusively financial. The trial judge's kinship relationship to the
prosecution was held irrelevant because the judge did not rule
on motions or objections made by his son." The only benefits
accruing to the judge would be "feelings of pride and satisfac-
tion"-matters not sufficient to create due process violations.6
Without further inspection, none of these rules or cases may
appear intuitively troublesome. However one case which has
adopted the standards discussed above reveals reason for serious
concern. That case, Del Vecchio v. Illinois Department of Correc-
tions, 7 highlights the danger for a potential deprivation of rights
when there are no clear standards for what constitutes a due
process violation.
In 1979, George Del Vecchio was tried and convicted of
murder, rape, and deviate sexual assault and sentenced to death
in Cook County Criminal Court.e The presiding judge, Louis
Garippo, had successfully prosecuted Del Vecchio on murder
charges fourteen years earlier in a highly publicized and sensa-
tionalized case.8 Judge Garippo's participation in the second
case was troublesome not only because of his prior prosecution
of the defendant, but because as judge, he ruled on the admis-
sibility of evidence and testimony from the first murder case? °
Judge Garippo's level of participation in the earlier prosecu-
tion was hotly disputed between the majority and dissenters in
the en banc decision (Del Vecchio I1).91 The majority maintained
83Id.
Id. at 1479-80. See supra text accompanying notes 9-18 for an analysis of Tumey.
Fero, 39 F.3d at 1480.
6!d.
87 8 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Del Vecchio I], rev'd, Del Vecchio I, 31
F.3d 1363 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1404 (1995).
'a Del Vecchio I, 8 F.3d at 510.
89 Del Vecchio II, 31 F.3d at 1368.
"Id. Judge Garippo's participation in the trial was also troublesome because even
though he remembered prosecuting Del Vecchio, Del Vecchio did not remember be-
ing prosecuted by Garippo. At no point during the trial did Judge Garippo reveal his
earlier role as prosecutor.
91 Id.
RECUSAL
that Judge Garippo's participation in the prosecution was terti-
ary, and that the few decisions he made were pro-forma rather
than exercises of discretion or judgment.92 In contrast, the dis-
senters in Del Vecchio II accused the majority of obfuscating
Judge Garippo's role in the first murder trial, instead suggesting
he was "intimately involved" in that trial.93
Specifically, the dissent maintained that Judge Garippo, in
his previous role as prosecutor, had been involved in every ma-
jor decision in the case.9 In particular, Garippo's exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in charging Del Vecchio as a minor in
the first murder resulted in Del Vecchio's early release from
prison, allowing him to kill again.9 While much in this case
turned on which characterization of the facts was accepted,
stripped of the factual dispute, the opinions in Del Vecchio IT still
hold much interest.
One important issue Del Vecchio IT addressed was whether
the appearance of bias itself created a necessity for recusal.9
The majority's interpretation of the Supreme Court "appear-
ance of justice"97 language was extremely constricted. The Del
Vecchio IT court found that language to stand for the proposition
that "judges must sometimes recuse themselves when they face
possible temptations to be biased, even when they exhibit no ac-
tual bias against a party or cause,"98 rather than the more strin-
gent standard that "bad appearances alone require
disqualification to prevent an unfair trial."9
Another controversial aspect of the majority opinion sug-
gested that even if'Judge Garippo was tempted to be biased, the
temptation did not amount to a due process violation because it
was not financial. 1® Moreover, the court contended that even if
Judge Garippo gave George Del Vecchio a "clear break" in the
first trial, the risk of bias would still be insufficient to mandate
'Id. at 1378.
"Id. at 1393 (Cummings,J., dissenting).
Id. (CummingsJ., dissenting).
"Id at 1393-94 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1371.
"See In reMurchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1954).
Del Vecchio HI, 31 F.3d at 1389.
Id. at 1371. The majority opinion also mentioned judicial bias was most prob-
lematic when the "lure of lucre" was involved. Id. at 1372-73.
"' Id. at 1372.
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disqualification. 1 ' While bias may have existed, it was not "sub-
stantial."10 2 The court rejected the notion that an average judge
in Garippo's situation would violate his oath of impartiality.'0 s
Suggesting bias in such a situation would be "inconsistent with
the presumption of honesty and integrity of those serving as ad-
judicators."0 4 The majority warned against an exaggerated
sense of propriety and erecting barriers in the way of Illinois' at-
tempts to give "an unrepentant and twice convicted murderer..
. a sentence the people of Illinois deem appropriate"-i.e. the
death penalty.'05
As for actual bias, the court held that the record showed
none.1°6 While this conclusion could be interpreted as evidence
that Judge Garippo erected a firewall between his previous
prosecution of Del Vecchio and the instant case, it does not
necessarily prove that he did. Actual bias can be extremely dif-
ficult to prove. If the system operates under the premise that
fair decision-making is not compromised by Judge Garippo's ac-
tions, it will reconcile the facts it sees in front of it with that
view. In Del Vecchio I, the court noted that:
If the judge is silent [and there is no obvious bias in the record] there is
no proof of actual bias. And if the judge does say things that sound par-
tial, there is still no evidence of bias because [in the mind of skeptics] if
the judge were really partial, he would have been smart enough to re-
main silent.
The en banc panel majority provoked two pointed dis-
sents.108 Judge Cummings, the author of the Del Vecchio I major-
ity, wrote that Judge Garippo's participation violated George
Del Vecchio's due process rights in two ways. First, Judge
Garippo was forced to sit in judgment of his own decisions as a
101 Id.
"' Id. at 1378-79.
103 Id.
"' Id. (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
105 IdM at 1379-80.
106 Id. For an interesting perspective on bias manifested through physical activities
by the judge not appearing in the written record but which may influence the jury
anyway, see Rachel Shoretz, Note, Let the Record Show: Modifying Appellate Review Proce-
dures for Errors of Prejudicial Nonverbal Communications by TrialJudges, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1273 (1995).
'0 Del Vecchio , 8 F.3d 509, 516 n.6 (7th Cir. 1993).




prosecutor.'O' Second, Garippo heard a case in which it would
have been natural for him to hold a grudge against the defen-
dant.110 Judge Cummings posited that when faced with a defen-
dant like Del Vecchio, any judge in Garippo's position "would
have felt a strong personal connection to the case.""' Garippo
apparently felt that Del Vecchio's recidivism was a personal af-
front to him, and that Del Vecchio had "dirtied his sweatshirt,"
by committing the second murder after Garippo's office had
treated him leniently.1 12 Judge Cummings' dissent in Del Vecchio
H stressed that while he did not necessarily see evidence of ac-
tual bias, the appearance of bias overhanging the trial was so
strong as to require that Garippo be disqualified . The test
Judge Cummings suggested was whether ajudge "under a realis-
tic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weaknesses
ought not to have presided" over a trial.n 4 He wrote:
A rule that requires recusal when the appearance of bias is as strong as it
is in this case, without requiring an independent showing of actual bias,
serves many ends... such a rule protects the accused from the danger of
unfair judging. It maintains for the benefit of society the appearance of
justice so necessary to the continued esteem of the judicial system.
Moreover, it protectsjudges... from unseemly excursions into their psy-
ches [because they did not follow this rule] .115
In a separate dissent, Judge Ripple criticized the majority
for its "underestimation of the effect that considerations other
than financial advantage can play in skewing judicial impartial-
ity." n1 In addition to the personal emotions Del Vecchio might
have aroused in Judge Garippo, electoral motivation might skew
impartiality as well. As a trial judge in Illinois, Judge Garippo
was required to run for reelection to continue serving."7  Al-
" Id. at 1392. (Cummings, J., dissenting). During the sentencing phase of Del
Vecchio's 1979 murder trial, evidence pertaining to his confession in his 1965 murder
trial was brought out. Del Vecchio claimed that the confession was coerced, and thus
should not be admissible to prove a pattern of violent crimes. Judge Garippo refused
to grant a hearing to Del Vecchio on this issue. Del Vecchio , 8 F.3d at 516. With the
federal government and states moving more and more towards "three strikes and
you're out" mandatory sentencing, the likelihood that a prosecutor-turnedzjudge
might be in such a situation will likely increase.
"0 Del Vecchio , 31 F.3d at 1392 (Cummings,J., dissenting).
M Id. at 1395 (Cummings,J., dissenting).
Id. (Cummings,J., dissenting).
Id. (Cummings,J., dissenting).
"1 Id. at 1396 (Cummings,J., dissenting).
"'Id. at 1397-98 (Cummings,J., dissenting).




though not directly drawing a link between Judge Garippo's
trial conduct and his concern for his own electoral future, the
dissent noted that Del Vecchio's second murder trial "called
into question the wisdom of the decisions that this trial judge
had made in the earlier stage of his career." 8 Pointing to re-
cent American political history,n9 Judge Ripple pointed out that
"[f] or many, if not most figures in public life, avoiding a cloud
over one's professional judgment is a great deal more important
than financial gain."120
One argument the dissent should have addressed more
forcefully was the majority's assertion that "bad appearances
alone [do not] require disqualification.",2 ' This argument sets
up a straw man. "Bad appearances"-without any limiting fac-
tor-could encompass so much as to allow challenges in nearly
every case. Republicans trying Democrats, teetotalers trying
drunks (but hopefully not vice-versa), and an endless variety of
permutations of judges and defendants on opposite sides of is-
sues could fall under the rubric of "bad appearances." How-
ever, when the "bad appearances" involve individuals with
particular and identifiable adversarial experiences towards each
other, such as prosecutor and defendant, the potential for bias
should not be sloughed off as cavalierly as did the majority.
The few circuit cases that have addressed the issue of
whether due process prohibits a judge from sitting in a case
where he has prosecuted the defendant are in agreement that
" Id. (Ripple,J, dissenting).
"9 This dissent cited Michael Dukakis's response to the Willie Horton advertise-
ment during the 1988 presidential campaign. See id. at 1399 n.1 (Ripple, J., dissent-
ing).
This point raises the interesting complications of having elected state judges. On
the general question of due process and judicial elections, see Scott D. Weiner, Note,
Popular Justice: State Judicial Elections and Procedural Due Process, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 187 (1996); see also Brown v. Doe, 2 F.3d 1236 (2d Cir. 1995) (defendant did not
have due process rights violated where judge used his conviction and sentence in a re-
election campaign advertisement). Of course, Del Vecchio poses the thorny problem
where ajudge had the incentive to be especially hard on the defendant so he did not
appear to have let a murderer off easy a second time. The political ramifications of
having twice allowed a defendant to "get off" are presumably ominous enough to
tempt many reasonable people into biased decisionmaking.




no violation of due process has occurred.'2 Courts have found
no bias in the records in these cases, despite, at least in one in-
stance, powerful evidence to the contrary, and despite the Su-
preme Court's admonition that the appearance of unfairness
can compromise due process as greatly as manifested bias itself.
IIM. THE PROSECUTORIAL ANDJUDICIAL FUNCTIONS
To properly examine the prosecutor-turnedJudge bias, it is
necessary to understand the differing roles of prosecutors and
judges, and why those roles might be in tension in certain cases.
The judiciary's failure to give this tension even cursory examina-
tion is one reason the jurisprudence in this area is so flawed.
A. THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION
Judicial behavior is generally guided by the Code ofJudicial
Conduct, set forth by the American Bar Association.12 The ideal
judge should be neutral and detached, and, in the words ofJus-
tice Felix Frankfurter, "[bie able to think dispassionately and
submerge private feelings on every aspect of the case." Judges
should be open-minded and should not prejudge the facts or
law in any case.12 Judges are to be detached reasoners, not
forceful advocates for one side or the other in a case.2 In addi-
tion to not prejudging facts and law, ideally, judges must be
completely willing and able to apply the law equally to all per-
127sons.
As human beings, judges may have different temperaments
and styles on the bench and in their writings. However, they
must strive to remain open-minded and fair, lest they run afoul
of 28 U.S.C. § 455 or, if they are state judges, their state's
equivalent.18 To buttress the ideal of fairness, judges are explic-
itly prohibited from hearing cases in which they have financial
interests,12 or obtain knowledge of the evidence through extra-
2 Id.; Layer v. Lyles, 598 F. Supp. 95 (D. Md. 1984), aftd, 767 F.2d 912 (4th Cir.
1985); Jenkins v. Bordenkircher, 611 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1979); Murphy v. Beto, 416
F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1969).
'2 MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCr (1990).
,21 Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466 (1952).
'2 See Shaman, suPra note 3, at 619-20.
1'6 Id.
12"7Id.
'2 See Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 238.
" See supra text accompanying notes 8-44.
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judicial sources, or appear to have pre-judged the evidence in a
130
case.
B. THE PROSECUTORIAL FUNCTION
The prosecutorial function is to represent the people of the
community in court. As part of the executive branch,'3' prose-
cutors are teamed with the police to serve as law enforcement
officers!" Certain aspects of the prosecutorial role grant prose-
cutors virtually unfettered discretion over individuals suspected
of crimes.1 3 3 There are four distinct elements of the prosecuto-
rial function entailing the amount and kind of contact with a
suspect/defendant that raise concerns about the prosecutor-
turned-judge's ability to grant these defendants fair trials.
These four roles are: first, investigating and charging a defen-
dant; second, the adversarial role during trial; third, contact
with the media about a trial; and fourth cooperation with the
victim and his family.
First, prosecutors make the decision to charge an individual
with a specific crime-a virtually unreviewable decision left al-
most entirely to the discretion of the individual prosecutor.'
This decision, even if it never leads to a guilty verdict, can have a
devastating impact upon the charged person's life.' It may
lead to short-term incarceration, loss of employment, social os-
tracism, financial cost, and tremendous stress on the part of the
defendant.'6 The decision to prosecute is necessarily based on
a lower evidentiary standard than that needed to convict, and
may be arrived at through relying on items inadmissible in court
such as police reports, rap sheets, and loyalty to and concern for
the victims,13 7 rather than a full balancing of all exculpatory evi-
ISO See Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 238.
1 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 681 & n.20 (1988) (noting the general ex-
ecutive nature of prosecutions, and the limited exceptions where a court undertakes
prosecutorial functions).
2 James W. Gunson, Comment, Prosecutorial Summation: Where is the Line Between
"Personal Opinion" and ProperArgument ? 46 ME. L. REV. 241, 243 (1994).
'" See Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversay System, 1992 BYU L.
REv. 669 (1992). See also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); Steven Alan
Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1365
(1987).




117 Nina Schuyler, Invisible Victims, CAL. LAw., Dec. 15, 1995, at 29, 30.
704 [Vol. 88
dence.'3 In this stage, the prosecutor may familiarize himself
with extremely lurid and grotesque details of the most heinous
crimes. The defendant is often thought of only in the context
of criminal accusations, and as the prosecution turns into trial,
evidence is usually viewed as conforming to the theory of the
defendant's culpability.'
39
The second part of the prosecutorial function, which is in-
compatible with giving a fair trial to a specific defendant, is the
prosecutor's role during the adversarial stage of the trial. At
this stage, prosecutors may be forced to paint an extremely
negative picture of the defendant in order to obtain a convic-
tion. Certainly prosecutors cannot cross certain professional
lines-they may not pepper their remarks with personal opin-
ions, nor are they supposed to inflame jury passions based on a
defendant's immutable characteristics, or other irrelevant fac-
tors.140 Nevertheless, in court, the prosecutor is an advocate for
the people and against the defendant. Because "[e]nsuring the
infliction of deserved punishment is part and parcel of the
prosecutor's job," the "prosecutor's attitude toward the defen-
dant in a hard-fought case is seldom benign or neutral.""'
Thus, many legitimate prosecutions can be deemed "punitive"
in nature. Once his case goes to trial, so long as he believes in
its validity, the prosecutor's job is to persuade twelve jurors be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the
crime charged.
In persuading those jurors, the prosecutor may make all
reasonable inferences about a defendant that are supported by
the record evidence.4  The record may include gory details of
crimes, references to prior bad acts and damning reputation
evidence. In closing arguments and rebuttal, the prosecutor
must use his advocacy skills to their fullest extent in "wag[ing]
the war" against the criminal. T If the defendant takes the
MMelilli, supra note 133, at 689.
159 !d.40 Gunson, supra note 132, at 243.
1..Reiss, supra note 133, at 1387.
342 Id.
'
4 Gunson, supra note 132, at 242, 245.
144 Id. at 244. See also AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL




stand, the prosecutor may question her credibility on cross-
examination.
145
A third feature of the prosecutorial function raising con-
cerns about the defendant's ability to receive a fair trial from
that specific prosecutor-turned-judge is prosecutorial interac-
tion with the media. The media will obviously not seek prosecu-
torial comment in all cases. However, in high profile cases,
prosecutors often become media figures. Prosecutors are
bound by due process and ethical constraints not to reveal
prejudicial information about the case or defendant.4 7 They
may, however, reveal information about the nature of the crime,
or status of an investigation, so long as they do not "try their
case in the press."
4 8
Nevertheless, prosecutors cannot ignore the press during a
highly publicized case, lest they lose control of their case, or be
misunderstood in the court of public opinion.4 9  Thus, the
prosecutor may leak sensitive and select information by speak-
ing to the media off the record or not for attribution.!"
One prominent member of the defense bar accused prose-
cutors of using press leaks to generate public pressure to kill
plea bargains, to stir up public condemnation of the defen-
dants, provide graphic and unflattering confidential informa-
tion about the defendants, and generally to "infect [a] jury and
salvage what was clearly a dying prosecution."'5' However prose-
cutors choose to interact with the media, press dealings force a
prosecutor to invest herself in a case outside the courtroom, and
may intensify the feelings against a defendant.
Finally, the recent trend in many states towards passing vic-
tims' rights constitutional amendments or legislation assuring
the victim or family of the victim a place along side the govern-
'0 AMERiCAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 144, at 77.
146 Consider the OJ. Simpson case, the Menendez brothers case, and the Bobbitt
trial. See Ellen Minnefor, Lookingfor Fair Trials In the Information Age: The Need for More
Stringent Gag Orders Against Trial Participants, 30 U.S.F. L. REv. 95, 95-97 (1995).
"' Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The Prosecutor, The Press, and Free Speech, 58 FORDHAM L.
REv. 865, 865-67 (1990).
148 Id.
.. Id. at 889.
0 Id. at 892.
"' Robert S. Bennett, Press Advocacy and the High-Profile Clien4 30 LOY. LA. L. REV.
13, 13-18 (1996). These comments refer to the unsuccessful prosecution of one of
Mr. Bennett's higher profile clients-banker Robert Altman.
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ment at a criminal trial or during the investigation may cause
tension for the judge presiding in a case where he has prose-
cuted the defendant.152 As of early 1997, at least twenty-six states
had constitutional amendments requiring that prosecutor's take
into account "victim's rights"'53 and three others had laws re-
quiring or permitting the same.5 Under the auspices of these
laws, prosecutors may be required to consult with, or in some
cases seek the approval of, the victim or family about plea bar-
gains. ' 5 Prosecutors may also be required to keep victims and
their families apprised of the status of the investigation or trial,
and elicit their testimony in a victims' impact statement post-
conviction. 56 While there is not yet an exact federal analog to
these state laws, 57 one federal statute requires prosecutors to as-
sist criminal victims in obtaining compensation and in prepar-
ing victim impact statements. 58 This intense personal contact
with a victim and/or his family may further personalize the
crime the prosecutor is prosecuting. Thus, the relationship be-
tween a particular prosecutor and defendant may become even
more adversarial and emotional.
.52 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (upholding impact statements as a
legitimate part of trial, relevant to ajury's decision); GEORGE FLETCHER, WITHJUSTICE
FOR SOME: Varts' RIGHTS iN CPRmwAL TRLS (1995); Carrie Mulholland, Sentencing
Criminals: The Constitutionality of Victims' Impact Statements, 60 Mo. L. REv. 731 (1995);
Stellisa Scott, Beyond the Victims' Bill of Rights: The Shield Becomes a Sword, 36 ARIZ. L.
REV. 249 (1994).
13 See Ai,& CONsT. amend. 557; ALASKA CONsT. art. I, 9 24; ARIZ. CoNs'r. art. II, §
2.1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16a; FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 16(b);
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22; ILL. CoNsT. art I, § 8.1; IND. CONSr. art. I, § 13(b); KAN.
CONST. art. 15, § 15; MICH. CoNsr. art. I, § 24; Mo. CoNsT. art. I, § 32; NEB. CoNsr.
art. I, § 28; NEv. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 22; N.M. CONsT. art. 2, § 24;
N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 37; OHIO CONST. art. I, §10(a); OILA. CoNsr. art. II, § 34; R.I.
CONsT. art. I, § 23; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24; Thx. CoNsT. art. I, § 30; UTAH CONST. art. I,
9 28; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-a; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 9m.
154 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (Michie Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 42-24-01 to
46-24-207 (1993); TENN. CODEANN. § 24-7-116 (Supp. 1993).
,' Robert Fichenberg, The Confrovesial Victims' Rights Amendments, 30 PROSECUTOR
5, 38-40 (1996).
' Id. See alsoJohn Albrecht, The Rights and Needs of Victims of Crime: TheJudges'Per-
spective, 34JUDGE'J. 1, 29 (1995).
7 Numerous members of Congress have introduced a Victims' Rights Constitu-
tional Amendment, which President Clinton endorsed during the 1996 Presidential
campaign. As of yet, the amendment has made no headway in Congress. See Fichen-
berg, supra note 155, at 38.
"8 Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248
(codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-64) (1994). See Peggy Tobolowsky, Restitution in the Fed-
eral Criminal Justice System, 77JUDICATURE 90 (1993).
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The job of prosecutor involves at least four roles that may
personalize a criminal action and demonize or dehumanize an
individual defendant whether or not that person is convicted.
From the highly discretionary and unreviewable decision to in-
vestigate and indict, to interaction with the media before, dur-
ing and after trial, to the aggressive and necessary courtroom
advocacy to win conviction, and substantial and substantive con-
tact with the victim and her family, a prosecution is a substantial
undertaking. At the very least, opportunities for bias against the
defendant or suspect abound at every turn.
IV. PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL PROBLEMS
In examining the practical problems with the current juris-
prudence on due process, it is important to remember that not
all bias can be eliminated. AsJudgeJerome Frank noted:
[T]here can be no fair trial before a judge lacking in impartiality and
disinterestedness. If, however, "bias" and "partiality" be defined to mean
the total absence of preconceptions in the mind of the judge, then no
one has ever had a fair trial and no one ever will. The human mind,
even at infancy, is no blank piece of paper. We are born with predisposi-
tions .... Without acquired "slants," life could not go on. Interests,
points of view, preferences, are the essence of living... [some of these
interests] represent the community's most cherished values and ideal...
and are part of the legal system itself.
1 59
These kinds of preconceptions--"interests, points of view and
preferences"-cannot and should not be eliminated from
judges' minds. They keep our legal system vital and connected
with public mores and morals. Other "interests" that a reason-
able judge may hold spring from personal contact, such as hav-
ing been involved in prosecuting a particular individual. When
an interest tainting the appearance of fairness comes from this
kind of experience, it poisons the system.16° That is not un-
avoidable bias, and it does nothing to foster the legitimacy of
the legal system. As demonstrated by George Del Vecchio's
case, bias can actually undermine the system by leaving ques-
tions about a judge's motivation, and the propriety of a death
161
sentence.
Thus, two important issues must be explored: first, how
courts have underestimated how influential even neutral judges
"9 In reLinahan, 138 F.2d 650, 651-52 (2d Cir. 1943).
"6 Lewis, supra note 47, at 404.
16' See supra text accompanying notes 87-121.
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are in jury trials. If neutral judges can strongly influence juries
in myriad ways, common sense dictates that the law should vig-
orously attempt to exclude judges with a strong reason to be bi-
ased from hearing certain cases. Second, the failure of courts to
properly examine their due process decisions in light of the val-
ues due process implicates and purports to uphold.
A. TBEJUDICIAL IMPACT ON THEJURY
Judges play a substantial role in determining the outcome
of a trial. However, it can always be exceptionally difficult for a
judge to maintain neutrality, or for a defendant to challenge a
judge's proclaimed neutrality. The judge may not even know
she is biased against a defendant, or if she is, may incorrectly as-
sume or rationalize away examples of bias in her decision-
making process. Finally, a past record of criminal behavior has
the potential to be extraordinarily prejudicial. When the crimi-
nal record is well known to the judge because she personally
shaped it as a prosecutor, it is too much to ask a reasonable per-
son to put that information aside and guarantee a defendant a
fair and neutral trial.
Decisions on whether defendants can truly receive due pro-
cess from judges who have previously prosecuted them have
failed to fully consider the role trial judges play in trial outcome.
One of the fewjudges to consider this issue wrote:
We cannot ignore the influence that the judge retains even in ajury trial.
I do not refer so much to the ability of the judge to communicate his
opinions to the jury through raised eyebrows, choice bits of sarcasm and
questioning of the witnesses that strays into advocacy .... I mean the ex-
traordinary ability of the trial judge to shape the trial itself.... She de-
cides what evidence the jury may hear ... what legal principles the jury
must apply, and even, to a significant degree, who will sit on the jury.
Thus, even when a verdict is not entrusted to her, a judge retains great
influence, if not directly upon the jury, then upon the myriad events that
culminate in the jury's decision.1
6 2
When making all of these decisions, a judge necessarily filters
them through the prism of her perceptions. It would be ex-
tremely difficult, if not impossible, for judges to divorce them-
selves from their preconceptions, especially when examining
questions of fact. "[P]hysiological, psychological or emotional
mechanisms may prevent assimilation of all the incoming in-
'' Collins v. Welbom, 81 F.3d 684, 701 (7th Cir. 1996) (Rovner, J., dissenting),
rev'd sub momn. Bracy v. Gramley, 117 S. Ct. 1793 (1997).
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formation, forcing judges... to process only those pieces of in-
formation that conform to their preexisting cultural and social
biases., 163 By extension, it seems natural that a prosecutor, who
may have developed deep-seated feelings about a particular de-
fendant through the adversarial system,64 would fail to shed
those feelings upon becoming a judge, and would process
pieces of information through the prosecutorial prism.
In addition, in an overburdened legal system (such as many
state and federal jurisdictions are) where judges do not have
sufficient time to gather or evaluate information, judges may be
more likely to rely on their own preconceived notions and mold
the limited information they receive to those expectations.l'
Buttressing this, lawyers often rely on stereotypes, portraying de-
fendants as career criminals or social deviants.'6 And, as one
commentator points out:
[Mostjudges strive diligently to avoid bias ... in making their decisions
and firmly believe their rulings are free from extraneous influences. But
psychologists tell us it is easy for persons to rationalize their behavior;,
individuals can almost always find excellent grounds for doing what they
want to do. Therefore, the bases judges give for their decisions could be
rationalizations or afterthoughts and not real determinants.
16 7
The issue of post-judgment rationalization causes problems
from the very outset of a trial. When the defendant moves at a
trial's inception to have the judge removed from the case for
bias, that judge paradoxically determines the merits of the mo-
tion9' This raises concern because:
[W]hen a party claims a judge's known passions and opinions will pre-
vent her from deciding according to the law... the judge can construe
the affidavits as setting forth conclusions rather than facts [and] can as-
sert a willingness to set aside extrajudicial views in court .... [W]riting
an opinion in this mode may prop up the judge's sense of her own recti-
'3 Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. R~v. 1, 6 (1994). Nugent points
out that these factors operate both consciously and unconsciously. Id.
' See supra text accompanying notes 131-58.
'65 Nugent, supra note 163, at 14.
Id at 12.
167 Id. at 6-7 (footnotes omitted).
'6*Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal and Reform, 53 BRoox. L REv. 589, 633
(1987). Although it is beyond the scope of this Comment, Stempel's article contains
interesting insights on this portion of the recusal conundrum, and an extremely
sharp criticism of then-Justice Rehnquist's refusal to recuse himself in Laird v. Tatum,
408 U.S. 1 (1972), a case about which he testified before Congress as an Assistant At-
torney General for the Office of Legal Counsel in the Nixon Administration. Stem-
pel, supra, at 633.
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tude; reading it often increases one's own dismay that the judge insists
on sitting.'6
In one respect, allowing judges to determine their own fitness to
sit in cases makes sense because they have subjective knowledge
about their own bias. However, the possibility of unacknow-
ledged and unseen motives is troublesome. As the Supreme
Court has noted, "when [a] trial judge is discovered to have had
some basis for rendering a bias judgment, his actual motivations
are hidden from review."170 Moreover, winning on appellate re-
view is difficult, if not impossible, because proof of improper
motives must often be made inferentially. It is "incredibly diffi-
cult to prove these matters, particularly if the.., adjudicator re-
sists admitting bias."171 In light of this, when "litigants seeking to
recuse unfavorable judges file motions, judges either step aside
or resist, with the most biased judges the least willing to with-
draw .... ,,172
This is not to suggest that more than a fewjudges purposely
act with bias against defendants. Nor does this analysis suggest
that prosecutors-turned-judges knowingly hide their motives
when they refuse to recuse themselves in certain cases. How-
ever, armed with the knowledge that judges may make decisions
to square with their own preconceptions of defendants and of-
fer justifications, a more vigorous enforcement of the "appear-
ance ofjustice" standard is merited.
A series of articles by Peter David Blanck highlights two is-
sues of particular concern: the difficulty in obtaining the ap-
pearance of fairness, and the enormous control judges exercise
over trials. 7 Blanck's articles are based on a series of empirical
studies showing that the "appearance of justice as reflected in
judges' behavior alone could predict the verdicts returned by
juries, as well as other aspects of juries' decision-making proc-
"9 Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 243-44 (footnotes omitted).
'"Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986).
17, Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 277 (footnotes omitted). See also Del Vecchio , 8 F.3d
509, 516 n.6 (7th Cir. 1993). Additionally, a trial by a potentially biased adjudicator
cannot be constitutionally remedied by having an unbiased appellate court review the
case. See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61 (1972).
'" Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 245.
"3 Blanck, supra note 4; Peter David Blanck, What Empirical Research Tells Us: Study
ingJudges'andJues'Behavior, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 775 (1991) [hereinafter Blanck, What
Empirical Research Tells Us]; Peter David Blanck et al., The Measure of the Judge: An Em-
pirically-Based FrameworkforExploring Trialjudges'Behavior, 75 IowA L. REv. 653 (1990).
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esses."'174 Blanck also notes the consensus that "juries accord
great weight and deference to even the most subtle behaviors of
the judge."'175 Not surprisingly, according to Blanck, a judge's
behavior is often predicated on his conceptions of the defen-
dant.176 Most alarming, judges tend to expect a guilty verdict
when the defendant has a relatively serious criminal history.'7
And, although criminal history should have no bearing on a de-
termination of guilt or innocence in an unrelated proceeding, it
appears to "influence judges' expectations for trial outcomes in
predictable ways." 78 Expectations or predictions of certain out-
comes in trials may influence judges to reveal what they think
the trial's outcome should be.'9 This behavior can turn into a
self-fulfilling prophecy and prejudice a jury against the defen-
dant.'8
A judge's knowledge of a defendant's criminal history-or-
dinarily not available to ajury unless a defendant testifies-can
"reveal to juries [the judge's] underlying beliefs about defen-
dants through nonverbal channels.""8 ' The judge's behavior
alone may convey a message to jurors concerning the defen-
dant's guilt or innocence.82 Studies indicate that this informa-
tion relates to a judge's behavior when she instructs a jury.183
This behavior influences juries' verdicts more often than is as-
sumed, ' 4 particularly in cases where the evidence is close."'s If
this empirical research is accurate, the danger of allowing de-
fendants to be tried by judges who previously prosecuted them
is obvious, both to the appearance of justice, and in subtler
ways, to the actual fairness of the trial.
Although not addressed in Blanck's study, a judge's own
participation in the creation of the defendant's criminal history
'
74 Blanck, supra note 4, at 898; see also Shoretz, supra note 106, at 1274.
'75 Blanck, supra note 4, at 892.
'76 Id. at 891-92.
'77 Id. at 898.
178 id.
'
79 SeeShoretz, supra note 106, at 1281.
.. Blanck, What Empirical Research Tells Us, supra note 173, at 784.
,' Blanck, supra note 4, at 898.
182 Id.
1" Id.
'Blanck, What Empirical Research Tells Us, supra note 173, at 792-93.
'Blanck, supra note 4, at 899.
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clearly aggravates this problem. In cases such as Bordenkirche S
and Lyles,1s7 where the judge previously prosecuted the defen-
dant, or Del Vecchio,ss where the initial prosecution was for a
brutal and notorious murder, the judge's role in creating the
defendant's criminal record could exacerbate the negative in-
ferences that a detached judge could draw about the defendant.
The "leaks" to the jury through verbal and non-verbal channels
might be more pronounced than in an ordinary trial. s9 They
may be heightened if the judge feels, consciously or uncon-
sciously, his previous prosecution was faulty in some way and al-
lowed the defendant lenient punishment, or failed to convict.
In rare instances, these "leaks" may be so flagrant as to cause an
appellate court to reverse the jury verdict.1'9 However, this net's
mesh is not fine enough to remedy the problem-defense at-
torneys face substantial obstacles in winning new trials because
of ajudge's "leaks" to the jury.19' Obviously, this problem would
only be amplified when a defendant like George Del Vecchio
(who did not recall Judge Garippo at the outset of his trial)
chooses a bench trial. If the defendant recognizes the judge,
and the judge chooses to hear the case, she is functionally de-
prived of a bench trial.
Given these factors, to ensure both actual impartiality and
the appearance ofjustice, a strong constitutional rule of recusal
is mandated. A prophylactic shield taking into account the
practical reality that a judge who helped form a defendant's
criminal record through active participation in the adversarial
system would alleviate some of these problems.92
'mJenkins v. Bordenkircher, 611 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1979).
Layer v. Lyles, 598 F. Supp. 95 (D. Md. 1984), affltd, 767 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1985).
'"Del Vecchio 1i, 31 F.3d 1363 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1404
(1995).
"9 See Blanck, supra note 4, at 898-99. Blanck suggests that a judge's attitude can
"leak" to the jury as indicated by the tone of his voice, or his verbal demeanor. Id.
This might also occur non-verbally through body language, shrugs, ignoring the de-
fendant, inattention and disapproving facial expressions. See Shoretz, supra note 106,
at 1275-80.
"o Shoretz, supra note 106, at 1287.
... Id. at 1283-85.
"2 Although prophylactic rules are not favored, they are not forbidden either. See
Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article I Legiti-
macy, 80 Nw. U. L REV. 100, 103 (1985).
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V. THE PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF DUE PROCESS
In addition to the practical dangers discussed, the current
status of constitutional recusal law fails to account for the par-
ticipatory, dignitary and legitimizing functions of the law. To
borrow an analogy, constructing such a due process house with-
out sufficient minimum floors protecting these interests is no
house at all.19 s
There are generally two conceptions of due process: in-
strumental and non-instrumental.'9 The protections of a genu-
inely neutral adjudicator are essential to all the values served by
these conceptions, including accuracy, equality, preservation of
the state's accusatory burden, respect for the personal dignity of
the defendant and the defendant's participation.9 5 This Section
highlights how the current system of optional recusal in trials
where the judge has previously prosecuted the defendant un-
dermines these primary values.
The instrumental theory of due process places the highest
premium on procedures that achieve accurate fact-finding in an
efficient manner.'9 Processes designed to efficiently arrive at
truth are most highly desired.9 7 The Supreme Court adopted
and defined the instrumental view in Matthews v. Eldridge'9
Matthews identified three relevant factors to weigh in determin-
ing what process was due a party in an administrative hearing:
first, the private interest affected by the official action; second,
the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest and the value
additional safeguards might add; and third, the burden on gov-
ernment that the additional safeguard would impose.'9
In this context, the right involved is the defendant's liberty
interest, and his freedom from erroneous conviction. There is a
variable risk of erroneous deprivation (depending on the level
of involvement the judge had in the prior prosecution, and how
," See Redish & Marshall, supra note 2, at 473.
" Id. at 475-91. See also Lewis, supra note 47, at 390-401 (referring to conceptions
as instrumental and intrinsic due process); John R. Allison, Combinations of Decision-
Making Functions, Ex Parte Communications, and Related BiasingInfluences: A Process-Value
Analysis, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 1135.
'9" See Redish & Marshall, supra note 2, at 475-91.
'9 Allison, supra note 194, at 1135 & n.1.
,97 Lewis, supra note 47, at 390.
"' 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id. at 335 (citations omitted).
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effectively she checks the factors Blanck notes). This risk can
be avoided by mandating recusal pre-trial where the judge ac-
tively participated in the defendant's previous trial. Arguably,
the cost of a prophylactic, mandatory recusal is lower than mul-
tiple appeals to determine (perhaps fruitlessly) whether there
was actual bias, or the appearance of bias was so great as to
mandate a new trial.
Another due process value (or as Jerold Israel calls it "a
cornerstone of the criminal justice system" 201) is the discovery of
truth. This differs from the purely instrumental approach be-
cause the search for truth does not tolerate bias in favor of effi-
ciency.202 This search for truth probes into minute allegations of
bias difficult to root out, regardless of cost (such as the kind of
bias explored in this Comment) .203 As applied to Del Vecchio, 2 4
for example, that might mean allowing the defendant intense
and searching discovery in order to probe every facet of Judge
Garippo's attitude and actions towards him. The search for
truth alone is inadequate by itself to promote a strong prophy-
lactic recusal standard because it does not at all account for ap-
pearances. In Del Vecchio II, as Judge Cummings noted-
conceding for argument's sake that no actual bias existed-
there was still an indelible stain over Del Vecchio's death
sentence merely because Garippo presided2 5 Thus, the search
for truth is not always paramount in the criminal process, both
on epistemological grounds and because truth finding may
subvert fairness goals such as "preservation of human dignity
and personal autonomy."
206
The protection of human dignity is a cornerstone of the
criminal process, and a core non-instrumental value of due pro-
cess. Non-instrumental values do not focus on the result of ac-
"'See discussion supra Parts I & IV .
"'Jerold H. Israel, Conerstones of theJudical Process, 2 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POLY 5, 6
(1993).
22Id. at 6, 11-12.
203Id.
See discussion supra notes 87-121.
Del Vecchio , 31 F.3d 1363, 1397 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Cummings, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1404 (1995).
Israel, supra note 201, at 12. Preserving these values despite the fact that they
may hinder fact-finding is why defendants have protections including the right




curacy, but rather ensuring that the truth can be arrived at fairly
using adequate procedural safeguards.27 Non-instrumental val-
ues primarily emphasize a party's right to participate in the de-
cision-making process.208
The non-instrumental approach emphasizes the appearance
of fairness as a key to due process.2 Some commentators rec-
ognize the Supreme Court's stamp of approval to recognition of
these values: "even if a given procedure does not clearly advance
accuracy, it generates 'the feeling, so important to popular gov-
ernment, that justice has been done."' 210 To feel that justice has
been done, fairness must be guaranteed and delivered upon:
"[t]he fact that criminal justice procedures are fair is not suffi-
cient; the procedures must also be seen as fair (and fairly ad-
ministered) by both its participants and the public. The
appearance of fairness... is vital to maintain the public confi-
dence." This appearance of fairness is what distinguishes out-
laws from the government. Government must play by fair,
neutral rules, even when those rules act to its detriment. If it
fails to honor those rules, or stacks the deck in its favor, it is lit-
de better than the criminals it prosecutes, from a due process
standpoint.
As Professors Redish and Marshall point out, "[flew situa-
tions more severely threaten [the appearance of fairness] than
the perception that a litigant never had a chance because the
decisionmaker may have owed the other side special favors.
212
If defendants are perceived to have been convicted by judges for
reasons of bias, and not because they actually violated laws, insti-
tutional faith in the justice system may be diminished, decreas-
ing respect for the rule of law.
To prevent this, the perception of fairness requires that a
judge be disqualified from a case if she has an identifiable po-
tential bias.13 This Comment has already identified potential
biases inherent in a judge overseeing a case where she previ-
See Redish & Marshall, supra note 2, at 483.
See Lewis, supra note 47, at 394.
Redish & Marshall, supra note 2, at 483.
210 Id. at 483 (quotingJoint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
211 Israel, supra note 201, at 20.




ously prosecuted the defendant: revenge for failed prosecution;
disappointment that exercises of prosecutorial discretion result-
ing in leniency failed to assist in the defendant's rehabilitation;
and fear of looking "soft" a second time in front of the elector-
ate in a competitive or retentive election. 4 Putting aside
whether these biases could be sufficiently avoided to guarantee
a fair trial, the appearance of unfairness still exists. Judges
Mannion and Easterbrook's majority and concurring opinions
in Del Vecchio ii highlight the jurisprudential failure to take this
appearance problem seriously enough.1
Respecting the dignity of the individual is another corner-
stone of the criminal justice system.21 6 Dignity includes the "ba-
sic needs of the human personality, including.., freedom from
humiliation and abuse."217 This element of due process is justi-
fied because "all persons, including criminals, are entitled to
governmental respect for their dignity as an inherent element
of the social compact [that] provides the foundation for a
democratic society."21 8 In the face of society's vigilant desire to
solve crimes and impose severe sanctions (sometimes at all
costs) on suspects, human dignity must be preserved by employ-
ing procedural safeguards. 9
This means not subjecting an accused defendant to a trial
where the judge has previously prosecuted her. Where the
judge participated as a prosecutor in a previous trial, the judge
likely drew negative conclusions about the defendant in decid-
ing to bring charges. She may have harshly condemned the de-
fendant in the courtroom or media, challenged her veracity, or
portrayed her as defective or immoral in some way. To be tried
by this same person does not keep the defendant free from hu-
miliation or abuse, nor does it protect her dignity2 0
2 4 See supra Part H (discussion of Del Vecchio dissents).
2,' Del Vecchio , 31 F.3d 1363 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1404
(1995).




2 It is important to again emphasize that nothing is wrong with prosecutors vigor-
ously exercising their duties. The problem is the incompatibility of exercising this
duty against a defendant and later exercising the far more restrained and dispassion-
ate judicial function against the same person.
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An interest that serves both instrumental and non-
instrumental due process values is the state's accusatorial bur-
den.221 Putting greater burdens on the state acknowledges its
greater resources, enabling it to gather facts more easily. The
burden is non-instrumental in that it relies on the premise that
the accused is innocent unless and until the state meets very
high burdens. 2 The purpose of the presumption is to force
judgment of the "accused's guilt or innocence solely on the evi-
dence adduced at trial."23 Allowing judges to try defendants
they have prosecuted may undermine this burden. Professor
Blanck's conclusion and concerns about the effect of a judge's
knowledge of a defendant's inadmissible criminal past (which
would ordinarily come from second hand documentary evi-
dence) 224 can only be amplified where ajudge knows about a de-
fendant's criminal record (or other bad acts) from previously
prosecuting him. Although empirical evidence is lacking on
this point, the possibility of lessening the burden is apparent.
Another non-instrumental value due process should serve is
equality.22 At bottom, this embodies the ideal that a judge
should not favor one side's facts or contentions for reasons ex-
trinsic to their accuracy or legal merits.226 "[S]imilarly situated
defendants must be treated alike ... distinctions drawn between
defendants must be based on grounds that are" not based on
impermissible factors.227 This value also implicates instrumental
concerns-when a judge treats defendants unequally, the
"truth" is more difficult to ascertain.28 Again, prior participa-
tion with the defendant's previous prosecutions weakens the de-
fendant's opportunity to receive actual equal treatment, and
diminishes the appearance of fairness.
Other values due process in the criminal justice system seeks
to promote are predictability, transparence, rationality and par-
ticipation.22 The first three factors are designed to facilitate
2" See Israel, supra note 201, at 15-16.
=~ Id.
2' Id. at 16.
'2' Blanck, supra note 4, at 898.
m See Redish & Marshall, supra note 2, at 483-84.
2% id.
Israel, supra note 201, at 21.
See Redish & Marshall, supra note 2, at 484.
See id. at 485-89.
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understanding of a judge's decision-making rationale.' The
public planning its future behavior, and other defendants await-
ing trial, must be confident that the "evidence ... [was] in fact
meaningful to the outcome," lest they fear that the rule of law is
supplanted by judicial flat.21 If the decision-maker is using ir-
relevant or forbidden criteria stemming from bias against the
defendant (including first-hand knowledge of prior prosecu-
tions), these goals are badly compromised.
Finally, due process should protect participation.2 2 "[T]he
participation value recognizes an individual's interest in con-
fronting the decision-maker in order to attempt to persuade her
to rule in his favor, or alternatively, to gain the psychological sat-
isfaction of having had some input into the decision."23 These
goals are frustrated if the defendant has little or no chance of
changing the judge's mind. If the defendant believes the prose-
cutor-turnedjudge is biased against him because of his criminal
activity, he may not even attempt to meaningfully participate in
his own trial, believing that the outcome is preordained.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ajudge sitting in a case where he has previously prosecuted
a defendant implicates due process concerns if he actually par-
ticipated in the prosecution. The issues discussed here strike at
deeply held notions of due process and fairness-criminal de-
fendants should not be able to invoke them without showing
that they are likely to be present. As the Fifth Circuit noted in
Mangum v. Hargett,2u concerns about non-financial or kinship
bias are only relevant where the judge participated in the earlier
prosecution, and participation requires "active involvement."m
Participation may take many forms-certainly Judge
Garippo's prosecutorial activities in George Del Vecchio's first
murder trial constituted "active involvement."M He exercised
substantial discretion in charging and sentencing. Other par-
ticipation includes the functions this Comment discusses: the
2"id.
"' Id. at 486 (citations and emphasis omitted).
2' Id. at 488.
usId
" 67 F.3d 80, 85-84 (5th Cir. 1995).
usId.
" See supra discussion accompanying notes 87-121.
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decision to investigate and attempt to indict; participation in
the adversarial state of the trial; contact with the media about
the case; and fulfillment of the requirements of victims' rights
laws. If the judge has had previous involvement of any of these
types (or similar to it) with the defendant, the concerns raised
here are implicated.
Although courts have not recognized the problem, a crimi-
nal defendant's right to a fair trial is compromised when the sit-
tingjudge has previously prosecuted him. The bias, which may
arise, or the stain on the appearance of justice, is greater and
more dangerous than the bias we should allow. Because these
dangers are personal and specific between one defendant and
one judge, it is always possible to find a less interested decision-
maker. The failure to do so in George Del Vecchio's capital
murder case left a "cloud of doubt that now and forever hangs
over the Del Vecchio trial that the judge was irremediably bi-
ased."23 7
As two academics have noted, "[t]o the extent that the
[bias] includes . . .avoidable predisposition, courts should re-
spond as in the case of a judge with a direct financial interest in
the outcome of the case."2s Although not all courts recognize
this, heeding this admonition fits within Supreme Court prece-
dent, recognizes due process and practical concerns, and can
avoid placing serious doubts on the fairness of criminal convic-
tions-including those involving the ultimate penalty.
23 Del Vecchio I, 31 F.3d 1363, 1398 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Cummings, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1404 (1995).
Redish & Marshall, supra note 2, at 501.
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